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[6. C.2d 855; 40 Cal.Rptr. 848. 395 P.2d 896J 
[L. A.'No. 27535. In Bank. Oct. 29, 1964.] 
BROWN DERBY HOLLYWOOD CORPORATION, Plain-
tift' and Appellant, v. JOSEPH HATTON et aI., Defend-
ants and Respondents. 
II] Adjoining Landowners-Encroachments-InjunctioDS . .....,.In an 
action between adjoining landowners, when defendant without 
privilege occupies plaintiff's property, an injunction is granted 
to remove the encroachment, but where the encroachment does 
not irreparably injure plaintiff, was innocently made, and 
where the cost of removal would be great compared to the 
inconvenience caused plaintiff by the continuance of the en-
croachment, the equity court may, in its discretion, deny the 
injunction and compel plaintiff to accept damages. 
[2] Id.-Encroachments-Injunctions.-That an action to enjoin 
an encroachment is between adjoining lessees of a common 
landowner does not make inapplicable the rule that an injunc-
tion should be granted to remove the encroachment in the 
absence of facts that would allow an equity court, in its discre-
tion, to deny the injunction and compel plaintiff to accept 
damages, since the rationale behind the rule is not to prevent 
injury to the freehold but to prevent a wrongdoer from gain-
ing control of land merely by paying a penalty of damages, 
and the landowner's consent to the encroachment cannot pre-
vent the tenant in possession from asserting during his term 
of years his right to protect the land against trespassers. 
[3] Id.-Encroachments-Injunctions.-In an action by one lessee 
to enjoin an encroachment by an adjoining lessee from the 
same lessor, the court might have difficulty in finding irrep-
arable injury to justify an injunction if plaintiff lessee has 
only a short-term interest, but when the court finds that there 
is such injury or that defendant lessee was not innocent, it 
should grant an injunction. 
[4] Id.-Encroachments-Injunctions.-Where an action to enjoin 
an encroachment is not one in which the public interest is 
involved, the court can readily grant an injunction if defend-
ant was :o.ot innocent. 
[6] Id.-Encroachments-Injunctions.-In an action to enjoin an 
encroachment by defendantf defendant is not innocent if he 
wilfully encroached on plaintiff's land; to be wilful defendant 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Adjoining Landowners, § 9 et seq.; Am.Jur. 
2<1, Adjoining Landowners, § 128 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-8] Adjoining Landowners, § 11. 
.l; 
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must not only know that he is building on plaintiff's land, . 
but must also act without a good faith belief that he has a " 
right to do 80. 
[6] 14.-Encroacbments-Injunctions-Appeal.-In an action to 
enjoin an encroachment by defendant, where the evidence on 
the question of defendant's good faith in' constructing the 
encroachment was in conflict, it was reversible error for the 
trial court to fail to make a finding on the issue of whether 
defendant acted in good faith, or in wilful disregard of plain-
tiff's rights hoping that a court would allow the atructure to 
remain and grant only a remedy of damages. 
[7] Id.-Encroacbments-Injunctions.-In an action by one lessee 
to enjoin an encroachment constructed by another lessee from 
a common lessor on land under a long-term lease to plaintiff, 
it was not error to find that plaintiff did not suffer irreparable 
injury and that defendant's hardship outweighed plaintiff's, 
despite the fact that plaintiff might make use of the land 
involved before its lease expires, where plaintiff did not claim 
that any of its present plans were hampered by the encroach-
ment, thus permitting the court to rely on the present use 
and nature of the land in ascertaining whether there was 
irreparable injury. 
[8] Id.-Encroacbments-Injunctions-Damages.-If, on retrial of 
an action by a lessee to enjoin an encroachment by defendant, 
also a lessee from the same lessor, but for a shorter term, the 
court awards damages in lieu of an injunction, relief should 
be granted to protect plaintiff throughout the course of its 
lease rather than for the duration of 'defendant's lease. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Ellsworth Meyer, Judge. Reversed with ' 
directions. 
Action for a mandatory injunction to compel removal of 
an encroachment on property leased by plaintiff and for a 
declaration of rights and duties under a lease and a sublease. 
Judgment denying injunctive relief and awarding monetary 
damages to plainti1f against defendant lessee reversed with 
directions. 
Frank J. Kanne, Jr., for Plainti1f and Appellant. 
Russell E. Parsons, MacFarlane, Schaefer &; Haun, Russell 
R. Pratt, Henry Schaefer, Jr., William Gamble, E. J. Calde-
cott and Jerol R. Hodges for Defendants and Respondents., 
i 
) 
) 
/ 
Oct. 1964] BBOwN DERBY HOLLYWOOD CORP. tI. HA'l'"l'ON 857 
[81 C.lIc! 855; 4D Cal.Rptr. 848, 395 P.2d 8Il61 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In 1945, Elizabeth Haun1 leased a 
building at 1610 North Vine Street in Los Angeles to defend-
ant Joseph Hatton that he used as a restaurant. Elizabeth 
Hann also owned adjacent property to the north and east of 
this building that she leased to System Auto Parks as a park-
ing lot. Shortly after defendant Hatton started his restau-
rant, he began using a strip of the land leased to System 
Auto Parks for the storage of garbage. This strip, approxi-
mately 5 feet by 48 feet. was adjacent to defendant Hatton's 
building. System Auto Parks did not object to this practice 
and in 1947 erected four or five iron posts marking the strip. 
In 1951, Mrs. Hann leased the parking lot to defendant 
Broadway Hales Stores until 1980. The lease provided that 
the tenant of the adjacent building (defendant Hatton) could 
enter on the land at reasonable hours for the removal of 
garbage. In 1952, Broadway subleased the property for the 
remainder of its term to plaintiff, Brown Derby Hollywood 
Corporation. The sublease contained the same privilege of 
entry as the lease to Broadway. Defendant Hatton entered 
into a new lease in 1954 that expires in 1969. 
From 1945 to 1961, defendant Hatton used the 5-foot strip 
to store garbage,. and no objection was made by plaintiff or 
its predecessors. After the iron posts were knocked down by 
automobiles in 1954 or 1955, plaintiff had a white line painted 
to mark the strip. In 1961, the Los Angeles Health and 
Fire Departments notified defendant Hatton that he could 
not continue the uncovered and unenclosed storage of garbage 
on the strip because of the odor and fire danger. He nego-
tiated unsuccessfully with plaintiff for additional space, and 
then, with the approval of his lessor, Mrs. Haun, began con- . 
struction of an extension of his building that enclosed the 
strip. One week after the work began, plaintiff's attorney sent 
a letter to defendant Hatton protesting the encroachment on 
plaintiff's property and demanding that the work be stopped. 
Hatton disregarded this notice, and the building was com-
pleted two weeks later. The extension was made largely of 
brick and cost approximately five thousand dollars. 
On December 13, 1961, plaintiff brought this action seeking 
a mandatory injunction compelling defendant Hatton to re-
move the extensio~ and asking for a declaration of rights 
and duties under the lease between defendants Haun and 
Broadway and the sublease between Broadway and plaintiff. 
lElizabeth HauD, now deceased, ill represented b,. Ra:ymond HaUD as 
the exeeutor of her will. 
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The trial court found that defendant Hatton had acquired" 
no right by prescription or otherwise to construct the ~- ' 
sion on the land subleased to plainti«. Finding that monetary 
,damages would be adequate, the court denied the injunetion 
, and awarded damages of $728.79 against defendant Batton 
to cover the period until March 31, 1969, when his J.eue \' 
expires, and entered judgment for defendants Baun and ' 
Broadway. Plaintiff appeals. III'i; [1] In an action between adjoining landowners, when the 
defendant without privilege occupies the plainti«'s property, 
an injunction'is granted to remove the encroachment. (Phil- f 
lips v. Isham, 111 Cal.App.2d 537 [244 P.2d 716].) But i 
",vhere the encroachment does not irreparably injure the 
plaintitI, was innocently made, and where the cost of remqval 
would be great compared to the inconvenience caused plaintitI 
by the continuance of the encroachment, the equity court may, 
in its discretion, deny the injunction and compel the plaintiff 
to accept damages." (Christensen v. Tucker, 114 Cal.App.2d 
554, 559 [250 P.2d 660]; see Dolske v. Gormley, 58 Cat2d 
513 [25 Cal.Rptr. 270, 375 P.2d 174]; PahZ v. Ribero, 193 
Ca1.App.2d 154, 163 [14 Cal.Rptr. 174]; Baglione v. Le!U, 
160 Ca1.App.2d 731, 734 [825 P.2d 471J.) [9] Defendant 
Hatton contends that this rule, designed -for cases of injur.y 
to the freehold, does not apply to situations like the present 
one in which the action is between lessees of a common land-
owner. This contention is without merit. The rationale b&-
hind the rule is not to prevent injury to the freehold but to 
prevent a wrongdoer from gaining control of land merely by 
paying a penalty of damages. The tenant in possession during 
his term of years is entitled to protect his land against tres-
passers (Strohlburg v. Jones, 78 Cal. 381 [20 P. 705]), and 
to obtain an injunction, if necessary, to protect his interest 
(Broads v. Mead, 159 Cal. 765 [116 P. 46, Ann.Cas. 19120 
1125] ; Hmlbron v. Fowler Switch Canal Co., 75 Cal. -426 
[17 P. 535]). The consent of the landowner to the encroach-
ment cannot prevent the tenant from asserting his rigbtl, 
for a landowner cannot interfere with his tenant's pOSSe!!8inn 
or ~njoyment by allowing others to enter upon the land. 
(Bessho v. General Petroleum Corp., 186 Cal. 183 [199 P. 
22].) [3] If the lessee has only a short-term interest, the 
court might have difficulty in finding irreparable injury to 
justify an injunction. When the court finds, however, that 
there is such injury or that the defendant was not innocent, 
it should grant an injunction. 
The issue in the present case is, then, whether the trial 
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court erred in finding that none of the factors existed that 
would necessitate an injunction. [4] Plaintiff contends that 
an injunction should be grantcd because defendant Hatton 
was not innocent. This case is not one in whieh the public 
interest is involved (Ukhtomski v. Twga Mutual Water Co., 
12 Cal.,App.2d 726 [55 P.2d 1251]). The court can therefore 
readily grant an injunction if plaintiff's contention is correct. 
[6] The defendant is not innocent if he wilfully en-
croaches on the plaintiff's land. (Christensen v. Tucker, supra, 
114 Cal.App.2d 554, 563; Agmar v. Solomon, 87 Cal.,App. 
127, 142 [261 P. 1029].) To be wilful the defendant must 
not only know that he is building on the plaintiff's land, but 
act without a good faith belief that he has a right to do so. 
(Oertel v. Copley, 152 Cal.App.2d 287 [313 P.2d 105].) 
Thus, if plaintiff in the present case induced defendant 
Hatton to believe that he had a right to act, defendant's claim 
of good faith is supported. On the other hand, continua-
tion of construction after objection by plaintiff suggests a 
lack of good faith. (Dunsmuir v. B~7,va, 154 Cal.App.2d 825 
[317 P.2d 653] ; Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 688-
689 [139 P.2d 976] j Felsefithal v. Warring,40 Cal.,App. 119, 
128 [180 P. 67J.) 
[6] The. evidence on the question of good faith is in 
con1lict. Plaintiff contends that defendant Hatton knew that 
he was building on the land leased to plaintiff, that he was 
told before construction that he had no permission to do so, 
and that a warning was sent one week after construction 
began demanding that the work be stopped. Plaintiff also 
points to evidence that part of the addition was used as a . 
dining room to prove that defendant Hatton did not have a 
good faith belief he was acting under a prescriptive right to 
store garbage. Defendant Hatton insists, however, that he 
acted under a good faith belief that he had a prescriptive 
right to build on the land and that plaintiff made statements 
encouraging this belief. He contends that plaintiff's ac-
ceptance of payment for the workers' parking of equipment 
during the construction and the fact that it gave him only 
one warning after the building was substantially completed 
contributed to his good faith belief. In the face of this con-
flict, the tria' court stated only that the encroachment was 
no mere inadvertence and that plaintiff did not expressly 
consent to the construction. These findings are not conclusive. 
Defendant's action can be intentional and yet be innocent if he 
acted in good faith. Moreover, plaintiff could have induced 
) 
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defendant's good faith belief without expressly consenting. 
The crucial issue is: Did defendant Hatton act in good faith 
or did he act in wilful disregard of plaintiB's rights hoping 
that a court would allow the structure to remain and grant 
only a remedy of damages' Since the trial court failed to 
make a finding on this crucial issue, the judgment must be 
reversed. 
[7] Plainti1f also contends that the trial court erred in 
finding no irreparable injury and that defendant Hatton'. 
hardship clearly outweighed that of plaintiB. It argues that ' 
although the strip of land bas not been used, plainti1f might 
make use of it before its lease expires in 1980. It might con- \ 
struct a building or doubledeck the parking area since its 
use of the lot is not restricted to a parking lot. This case is 
not one, however, in which the plaintiff contends that any 
of its present plans are ~ampered by the encroachment. (See 1 
PahZ v. Rt.oero, supra, 193 Ca1.App.2d 154.) The trial court : 
therefore properly relied on the present use and nature of the 
land in ascertaining whether there is irreparable injury. 
(BagUone v. Leue, supra, 160 Ca1.App.2d 781, 785; Chris.; 
tensen v. Tuc'ker, 8Upra, 114 Cal.App.2d 554, 557; Nebel v. 
Guyer, 99 Cal.App.2d 80 [221 P.2d 837].) 
[8] Finally, plaintift contends that the judgment does 
not award damages for the "whole wrong." It contends that 
since it was awarded damages only until 1969, when defendant 
Hatton's lease terminates, it is not protected until 1980, when 
its own sublease ends. In its memorandum opinion, the trial 
court stated that plaintiff could make a proper adjustment 
with the common lessor Haun and the sublessor Broadway to 
cover the period until 1980. It made no finding, however, 
declaring the rights of the parties in this regard. If damages 
in lieu of an injunction are awarded on retrial, relief should 
be granted to protect plaintiff throughout the course of its 
sublease. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the 
trial court with instructions to determine on the basis of the 
evidence previously presented and such additional evidence· 
as may be presented by the parties whether or not the en-
croach~ent was· innocently made. 
McComb, J., Peters, y., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Kosk, J., 
and Schauer, J.,. concurred. 
*Betbed oTustice of the Supreme Court llittinJr uder usipment 1»7 
the Chairman of the oTllclie.ial Council. 
